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NOTES
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND A
COMPARISON OF APPROACHES TO SEXUAL
LIBERTY
William Council*
Over 150 years ago, Congress passed and the states ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment, banning states from passing or enforcing laws based
on unconstitutional classifications and protecting persons in the United
States from adjudication without due process. For over one hundred years,
however, courts and commentators have been fighting over the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause’s controversial protections of substantive
rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has applied inconsistent methodologies to
these substantive due process claims, attempting to walk a tightrope between
the Court’s power to subjectively announce new rights as “fundamental” and
the traditional role of the states’ plenary police powers.
The Court’s ability to announce new subjective rights has morphed and
evolved over time—both in terms of the rights elevated, ranging from
economic rights to contraception, child-rearing, and, most recently,
marriage equality, and the methodology used to elevate those rights. Against
this backdrop, there currently is a circuit split regarding the status of state
laws criminalizing the sale of sex toys. According to some, these devices are
an essential element of sexual liberty and their criminalization represents
paradigmatic government overreach. Conversely, supporters of state laws
criminalizing sex toys believe their regulation falls within the states’
traditional authority to legislate questions of moral judgment.
This Note examines the tension between these two conceptions of sex toy
regulation and criminalization and the broader ramifications for substantive
due process methodology. Since choosing whether or not to use sex toys is a
consequential decision implicating sexual autonomy and privacy, state laws
that burden their use unconstitutionally step into the protected sphere of
liberty that the Fourteenth Amendment protects.

* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2016, American
University. Thank you to Professor Joseph Landau for your guidance and encouragement, the
Fordham Law Review team for your excellent critiques and tireless work, and to my friends
and family, particularly Julia, for endless patience and wisdom.
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INTRODUCTION
Online retailers, brick-and-mortar shops, and other vendors sell a wide
variety of sex toys to individuals and their partners that comport with their
private desires and needs. However, no sale of sex toys will occur in
Alabama where the state legislature has criminalized the sale of sexual
devices, declaring them immoral.1 Decisions regarding sexual privacy and
expression are some of the most intimate and private that individuals and
couples make.2 In the United States, consenting adult couples are relatively
free to engage in relationships as they see fit.3 Further, while marriage
equality for same-sex couples has existed for a short period since 2015, the
law now legally protects the LGBTQIA+ community’s sexual liberty4 and
grants it equal status.5 At the same time, states and the federal government
1. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2020) (banning the sale of devices that stimulate human
sexual organs).
2. See Donald H. Herman, Pulling the Fig Leaf Off the Right of Privacy: Sex and the
Constitution, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 912 (2005).
3. See Aziza Ahmed, Adjudicating Risk: AIDS, Crime, and Culpability, 2016 WIS. L.
REV. 627, 630 (discussing a variety of laws that criminalize sexual activity or nondisclosure
of status by HIV-positive persons). These laws exist with other laws that criminalize some
forms of consensual sex. However, this Note does not address those issues; rather, it focuses
on consenting adults’ (who do not have HIV or a similar condition implicating other laws)
choices to use sex toys.
4. See infra Part I.E (discussing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), and the
legalization of same-sex marriage).
5. See infra Part I.E.
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regulate many aspects of our private lives.6 For instance, states regulate
marriage and divorce,7 nearly all states have laws banning polygamy and8
bestiality9 and proscribing sex before the age of consent,10 and many states
prohibit marriage between first cousins.11
These regulations are commonly justified as protecting individuals from
harm and coercion. However, many laws prohibiting private sexual conduct
are justified solely under a pretense of “morality”—that is, a state using its
criminal code to advance its own conception of morality by invading private
decisions and criminalizing private, sexual conduct. This includes laws
criminalizing the sale or possession of sex toys.
Laws targeting private, sexual decisions are primarily state driven,
although there is tension between state and federal powers. Principles of
federalism dictate that state governments should serve as the primary
regulators of their citizens through the exercise of their police powers. At
the same time, the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights
against the states, requiring the equal protection of the laws and guaranteeing
due process, thus restricting the permissible scope of state action.12
While scholars and commentators have considered the impact of sex toy
regulations,13 the issue has not received as much attention in scholarship or
from the media as it may deserve. But the impact of regulations banning sex
toys is far-reaching and the devices are hardly taboo to those who need them
or would like to include them as part of their sexual experiences. Legal
proscriptions against their use overtly limit and criminalize consenting
adults’ sexual liberty; they limit certain couples, particularly those with

6. This Note explores the concept of morality as a justification for laws. Since the
Mayflower Compact, lawmakers have justified many laws on morality grounds. See Sally
Turner, The Health Benefits of Sex Toys, PATIENT (Sept. 27, 2018), https://patient.info/newsand-features/sex-toys-health-benefits-for-women [https://perma.cc/37UD-EAW5].
7. See Vivian E. Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 38
(2006). See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice
Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497 (2000).
8. See Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 331, 342 (2016).
9. See Julie Carr Smyth, Bestiality Crimes Targeted by New State Laws, FBI Reporting,
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/bestiality-crimestargeted-by-new-state-laws-fbi-reporting [https://perma.cc/6EJJ-ZL5Z] (noting the general
criminal prohibition on bestiality).
10. See Eugene Volokh, Statutory Rape Laws and Age of Consent in the U.S., WASH. POST
(May 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/
01/statutory-rape-laws-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/P9PU-M3U6] (surveying age of consent
laws by state).
11. See Sheri Stritof, What Are the Cousin Marriage Laws in Your State?, THE SPRUCE
(Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.thespruce.com/cousin-marriage-laws-listed-by-state-2300731
[https://perma.cc/4D2G-UBVC] (finding that fourteen states outright ban marriage between
close cousins, while most other states allow it only under certain circumstances).
12. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Curtis Waldo, Toys Are Us: Sex Toys, Substantive Due Process, and the
American Way, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 807 (2011).
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communicable diseases such as HIV, from practicing safe sex.14 However,
the status of sex toy regulation, and morality as the sole justification for
invading liberty, has been questioned by modern substantive due process
cases arising from the privacy and LGBTQIA+ rights litigation of the 1980s
through the 2010s. Moreover, the unique barriers to intimacy that many sex
toy users face provide a compelling argument that these devices are a
necessary expression of liberty, privacy, autonomy, and self-definition that
the government cannot invade, even under a rational basis test.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the constitutionality
of regulating sex toys, there is a split on this topic between the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits.15 In Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle,16 the Fifth Circuit
held that, in light of Lawrence v. Texas,17 Texas had violated its citizens’
substantive due process rights to intimacy and sexual autonomy by
prohibiting the sale of sex toys.18 Conversely, in Williams v. Attorney
General,19 the Eleventh Circuit found that Alabama’s ban on the sale and
marketing of sex toys was a permissible exercise of its police powers and
inherent state sovereignty because neither Lawrence nor its predecessors or
progeny ever created a general substantive due process right to sex or
intimacy, let alone a specific right to use sex toys. The Williams court—
instead of relying on Lawrence—relied on Washington v. Glucksberg,20
finding that, for a right to be protected by substantive due process, it must be
deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition, a narrower standard.21
This Note examines the circuit split described above, the status of state
regulation of sex toys more generally, and the broader ramifications for
substantive due process methodology in anticipation of how the Supreme
Court might rule. Further, this Note examines the development of sexual

14. See HIV Prevention: Low/No Risk Sexual Practices, AFAO, https://www.
afao.org.au/about-hiv/hiv-prevention/low-no-risk-sexual-practices [https://perma.cc/4KTGNWQC] (last visited June 22, 2020).
15. Compare Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742–43 (5th Cir. 2008)
(finding that Texas’s ban on sex toys violates the Due Process Clause), with Williams v. Att’y
Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding Alabama’s prohibition on sex toy sales
constitutional under the Due Process Clause).
16. 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding state and local laws outlawing consensual,
private, and intimate same-sex sexual contact unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
17. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Lawrence, the Court struck down a Texas statute that
criminalized private sexual conduct between consenting LGBTQIA+ couples. Id. at 578.
Importantly, the Court relied on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to find
that the Texas statute invaded a protected liberty interest, though the Court did not announce
a substantive due process right to sex. See id.
18. See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744.
19. 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
20. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). In Glucksberg, the Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the
Due Process Clause encompasses a right to physician-assisted suicide. Id. at 727–28. Of
methodological significance, the Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment only protects
fundamental rights that are “deeply rooted” in the nation’s history and tradition. See id. at
720–21.
21. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239.
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rights—and the right to use sex toys—through the lens of Romer v. Evans,22
Lawrence, and Obergefell v. Hodges.23 Specifically, this Note looks at the
liberty interest asserted by users of sex toys and retailers who assert the rights
of individuals, the due process right implicated by state regulation of sex
toys, the broad scope of liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the current methodology for substantive due process claims.24
Part I.A of this Note explores how sex toys are defined under the law,
details how they have been criminalized, and illuminates their practical
necessity. Part I.B outlines the historical background of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the development of the substantive
due process doctrine.
Part I.C analyzes substantive due process
methodology, looking at a number of tests that have been used over the past
one hundred years. Part I.D discusses the history of morals legislation25 and
morality as a justification for restricting individual liberty, offering
background on Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to Reliable Consultants,
Inc. and Williams. Part I.E explains how Obergefell, which the Court decided
after Reliable Consultants, Inc. and Williams, altered morals jurisprudence
and may cast the circuit split in a new light.26
Part II discusses the split between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and the
different ways in which these courts have applied substantive due process
methodology. The Fifth Circuit found that laws criminalizing sex toys
burden the right to sexual privacy, which Lawrence classified as a protected
liberty interest.27 Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit found that, because
Lawrence neither explicitly recognized a fundamental right to sexual privacy
nor outwardly rejected morality as a justification, the state law only needed
to be rationally related to the state’s morality interest.28
22. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding invalid under the Equal Protection Clause a provision
of Colorado’s constitution that prohibited local communities from codifying protections for
LGBTQIA+ individuals beyond those offered at the state level).
23. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (finding that under the Due Process Clause—and supported by
the Equal Protection Clause—there is a fundamental right to marriage that same-sex couples
cannot be deprived of).
24. As this Note explains, the Court has approached substantive due process questions
with different and oftentimes competing methodologies. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)
(discussing the importance of autonomy and self-determination to the liberty inquiry).
Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding that substantive due process is
guided by history and tradition but informed by the Equal Protection Clause, societal changes,
democratic consensus, and reasoned judgment), with Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (holding that
any substantive due process right must be deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition
to be considered “fundamental”). But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122–23
(1989) (subscribing to the strict history and tradition test).
25. While many U.S. laws, including criminal laws, have roots in basic Western and
Judeo-Christian notions of morality, this Note focuses on criminal laws targeting activities
that, on their own, neither present a harm or coercion risk to any group nor are dangerous as
used by an individual or consenting couples.
26. Obergefell was decided in 2015, and the Court’s application of equal protection
analysis to the substantive due process question may be dispositive to the sex toy cases and to
future substantive due process litigation. See infra Part I.E.
27. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008).
28. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004).
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Part III examines what each of these two holdings would mean for broader
substantive due process jurisprudence if adopted by the Supreme Court. Part
III.A examines what the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of substantive due
process methodology would mean for a broader right of sexual privacy. Part
III.B examines how the Eleventh Circuit’s deference to state police powers
and use of history as a guidepost would suggest a narrower liberty interest
and retain the state’s traditional role of regulating morals.
Finally, Part IV suggests that, in light of Obergefell, Williams
misidentified the liberty interest asserted and applied an overly narrow test
for substantive due process. Specifically, this Note argues that state
regulation of sex toys is a paradigmatic government overreach into the
personal liberties of its citizens. From there, this Note concludes that the
correct reading of Lawrence and Obergefell establishes that the proper
analysis involves a heightened form of rational basis review for state action
invading sexual autonomy, which can only be overcome by a showing of
harm or coercion.
I. THE HISTORY OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, SEX TOY REGULATION,
AND STATE LAWS GROUNDED IN MORALITY
Since its ratification, courts have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause to protect more than just fair procedure in the
adjudication of claims.29 Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment includes a
substantive component, preventing the government from regulating certain
aspects of life or activities that are deemed fundamental to the concept of
liberty.30 At the same time, sex toys have also existed for hundreds of years
and have played a role in the sexual expression of individuals and couples.31
Part I.A discusses sex toys and their practical uses. Part I.B provides
background about substantive due process. Part I.C then discusses the
concept of morals as a justification for state policies restricting liberty.
Finally, Part I.D introduces Obergefell, a significant case for the
development of substantive due process that is possibly dispositive to the
resolution of this circuit split.
A. The Practical Necessity of Sex Toys and the Statutes at Issue
Sex toys are, in a legal sense, devices whose primary purpose is the
stimulation of human sexual organs.32 This includes manual and electronic
29. See David E. Bernstein, The History of “Substantive” Due Process: It’s Complicated,
95 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 2–9 (2016) (identifying that substantive due process doctrine
originated in the 1870s but recognizing that some scholars only date modern substantive due
process doctrine back to the early twentieth century).
30. See id. at 2.
31. See Katie Heaney, The 30,000-Year History of the Sex Toy, THE CUT (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.thecut.com/2017/11/the-30-000-year-history-of-the-sex-toy.html
[https://
perma.cc/8ZAK-2T2B].
32. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2020) (defining a sex toy as a device for “the
stimulation of human genital organs”); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(7) (West
2020), invalidated by Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008).
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devices that massage human genitals and prosthetic devices that simulate
male and female sexual organs.33 Sex toys serve a number of goals and
interests for both consenting adults in intimate relationships and individuals
outside of relationships.34 First, sex toys enable intimacy for adults who are
otherwise physically unable to replicate the devices’ effects.35 Second, in
relationships where one partner is unable to perform sexually, sex toys allow
the individual to provide sexual gratification to the other partner.36 Third,
for those with communicable diseases such as HIV, sex toys allow for safe
sex and preserve dignity in intimate relationships by facilitating safe sexual
intercourse without the stigma or risk of transmitting disease.37 Fourth, sex
toys are therapeutic for those suffering from certain sexual limitations, such
as erectile dysfunction.38 Finally, sex toys allow asexual adults, individuals
without sexual partners, and others who choose to abstain from sex for any
reason to find intimate gratification.39
Opposition to sex toys largely derives from taboos associated with their
use and the view that they promote sexual promiscuity.40 Sex toys are not
necessary for procreation, which leads many religious and socially
conservative groups to oppose their use as part of a general opposition to
sexual expression that is detached from procreation.41 In addition, the use of
sex toys is particularly prevalent among two groups that have historically
been politically disadvantaged: people with communicable sexually
transmitted diseases and LGBTQIA+ couples.42 Further, some states,
including Alabama, contend that allowing the retail sale of sex toys is
equivalent to selling sex, the regulation of which is a recognized valid interest
of state governments.43 However, sex toys do not present the same societal
risks that prostitution,44 underage sex,45 or polygamy46 do. For one, they are
33. See Marissa Gainsburg et al., The 24 Best Sex Toys for Couples in 2020, WOMEN’S
HEALTH MAG. (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.womenshealthmag.com/sex-and-love/
g19984127/best-couples-sex-toys/ [https://perma.cc/F3BB-WSVA].
34. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 742–43 (discussing the recognized uses of sex
toys).
35. See Turner, supra note 6.
36. See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 742.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64, 72–76 (La. 2000) (holding that Louisiana’s
obscene device statute fails rational basis review).
40. See generally Danielle J. Lindemann, Pathology Full Circle: A History of Antivibrator Legislation in the United States, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 326 (2006).
41. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION 201–02 (2017) (discussing the
severe penalties of the Comstock Act).
42. See Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 153–59 (2014)
(discussing the history of sex toy legislation and its aims).
43. See Brief of Appellant William H. Pryor Jr. at 16–17, Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378
F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-16135-DD).
44. See Erotic Serv. Provider Legal Educ. & Rsch. Project v. Gascon, 880 F.3d 450, 456
(9th Cir. 2018) (finding that substantive due process protects the choices of intimate couples
in relationships and not sex per se, including prostitution).
45. See id.
46. Id.
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not coercive and are designed for and marketed to consenting adults. Further,
by their design, they do not transmit diseases and are not a risk to public
health. Therefore, the use of sexual devices is fundamentally victimless,
distinguishing it from other recognized government interests.47 Contrast this
with other pleasure-inducing, yet possibly dangerous, devices such as
electronic cigarettes, which present the government with a bona fide
regulatory interest.48
Proponents and opponents of sex toy use both analogize the devices to
different sex-related products that have already been the subject of
constitutional challenges. For supporters, sex toys are like contraceptives in
that, even though they are commercial in nature, they are part of the liberty
right of married and unmarried persons to engage in sexual activities
detached from procreation. For detractors, sex toys are more akin to obscene
materials, essentially constituting commercial sex that deserves no
heightened constitutional status.49
Alabama and Texas both established, under similar pretenses, criminal
penalties for the sale and distribution of sex toys.50 This Note focuses on
state laws that ban the sale or distribution of sex toys outright and impose
criminal penalties for the activity of selling on a commercial scale.
Chapter 12 of Alabama’s criminal code prohibits “Offenses Against Public
Health and Morals.”51 This chapter includes the 1998 Anti-Obscenity
Enforcement Act52 (“Alabama Obscenity Act”), which, in relevant part,
makes it a crime for “any person to knowingly distribute, possess with intent
to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute any obscene material or any device
designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital
organs.”53 The law provides harsh penalties for violators who sell or
distribute sex toys: first-time offenders face up to a $10,000 fine and one
year in jail or one year of hard labor, while repeat offenders face up to ten
years in prison and, for corporations or business entities, $50,000 in fines.54

47. But see Sarah Sloat, America Has an Extremely Disturbing Sex Toy Problem, INVERSE
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.inverse.com/article/30641-sex-toys-testing-regulations [https://
perma.cc/9LQZ-MWTP] (noting that sex toys can be dangerous if not produced or sold under
sanitary conditions). This Note does not assert that the state has no interest in regulating such
devices but rather that criminalization or an outright ban represents an inappropriate
overreach.
48. See Karen Zraick & Jacey Fortin, Is It Time to Quit Vaping?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/health/is-vaping-safe.html [https://perma.cc/
7F8U-UR3X].
49. See Jess Joho, We’re in a Sex Toy Revolution. Here’s How You Can Join, MASHABLE
(Nov. 4, 2019), https://mashable.com/article/sex-toy-revolution-beginners-guide [https://
perma.cc/F6HK-TZ3U].
50. See supra note 32.
51. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2020).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. A second violation of the Act is a Class C felony, id., which carries a sentence of “not
more than 10 years or less than 1 year and 1 day.” Id. § 13A-5-6; see also Williams v. Att’y
Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233–34 (11th Cir. 2004).
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The Alabama Obscenity Act was passed at an active moment for morals
legislation, and challenges thereto, in the United States during the so-called
“culture wars” of the 1980s and 1990s.55 Congress had passed the Defense
of Marriage Act56 (DOMA) in 1996, which defined a marriage (for purposes
of federal benefits) as a union between one man and one woman.57 DOMA,
which was later ruled unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause,58
had been primarily justified under two government interests: (1) encouraging
procreation and (2) “advanc[ing] the government’s interest in defending
traditional notions of morality.”59 Indeed, the House of Representatives’s
committee report accompanying DOMA said: “This judgement entails both
moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian)
morality.”60
The Alabama Obscenity Act’s drafters employed a similar justification.
Efforts to pass the Act began with Alabama State Senator Tom Butler, whose
primary interest was banning nude dancing.61 The inclusion of sex toys in
the final bill, which did not originally mention the devices, was the result of
a concerted lobbying effort.62 One of those lobbyists, Dan Ireland, former
director of the Alabama Citizens Action Program, a conservative advocacy
organization, suggested that sex toys were a greater public threat than
firearms and articulated the urgency of regulating sex toys by proclaiming
that while “there are moral ways and immoral ways to use a firearm . . . there
is no moral way to use one of those devices.”63
Passed in 1973, Texas Penal Code sections 43.21 and 43.22 criminalized
the distribution, marketing, and advertising of obscene devices.64 The statute
defined an obscene device as “a device including a dildo or artificial vagina,
designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital
organs.”65 While the Texas statute was eventually overturned, it too had been
enacted to assert a state conception of morality.66 The Texas attorney general

55. Jeffrey Aaron Snyder, America Will Never Move Beyond the Culture Wars, THE NEW
REPUBLIC (Apr. 23, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/121627/war-soul-america-historyculture-wars-review [https://perma.cc/XQ7K-GUFP].
56. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), invalidated by United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S. 744 (2013).
57. See 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
58. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 769.
59. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 15 (1996).
60. Id. at 15–16.
61. See Sex Toy Ban May Be Enforced in Alabama, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Oct. 2, 2007,
12:05 PM), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/2007/10/02/Sex-toy-ban-may-be-enforced-inAlabama/90051191341143 [https://perma.cc/M8D8-XK4V].
62. See Jacob M. Appel, Alabama’s Bad Vibrations, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2009),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/alabamas-bad-vibrations_b_300491
[https://perma.cc/
Q9NH-NVHY].
63. Id.
64. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21–43.22 (West 2020), invalidated by Reliable
Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008).
65. Id. § 43.21.
66. See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 74.
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noted that the law “is based on several police-power interests in protecting
public morals—discouraging prurient interests in sexual gratification,
combating the commercial sale of sex, and protecting minors.”67 However,
these interests are not clearly served by the criminalization of sex toys, which
inherently involve no coercive element.
The statute was first challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment in a
Texas state court in 1985.68 There, an individual was arrested, charged, and
convicted of possession of an obscene device with intent to distribute.69 The
defendant received a $750 fine and three days in jail.70 The court looked to
the contraception and abortion cases of the 1960s and 1970s before finding
that the statute did not violate any liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment or any similar provision of the Texas Constitution.71 First, the
court interpreted the right of privacy, articulated in Roe v. Wade72 and
Griswold v. Connecticut,73 as applicable strictly to decisions of procreation
and child-rearing74 and held that the right protected “individual decisions in
matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion.”75 Finally, the court
found that the rationale underlying the state’s exercise of police power—
order and morality—justified the state’s criminalization of sex toys.76 This
justification fits within the traditional construction of the state’s police
powers and the traditionalist conception of a limited judicial role in rights
declaration.
B. The History of the Fourteenth Amendment and Substantive Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”77 Since at least 1887, courts have found the word “liberty”
to carry with it a substantive component that protects affirmative rights.78
While substantive due process is one of the most controversial areas of
constitutional law, with scholars differing on its exact meaning and history,
the Supreme Court began to recognize certain unenumerated substantive

67. See Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott’s Appellee’s Brief at 7–8, Reliable
Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d 738 (Nos. 06-51067 & 06-51104).
68. Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
69. Id. at 261.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 262.
72. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a fundamental
right to abortion).
73. 318 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that married couples have a fundamental right to access
contraception because the penumbras of the Constitution protect marital privacy); see also
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the contraception right to unmarried
couples under the Equal Protection Clause).
74. See Yorko, 690 S.W.2d at 262.
75. Id. at 264.
76. Id.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 630–31 (1887).
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rights protected by the Due Process Clause beginning in the 1890s.79 In these
early cases, heard into the beginning of the twentieth century, the Court
recognized that the Due Process Clause protected certain natural rights—
including, most notably, freedom of contract.80 While the modern doctrine
has changed, these early cases set the foundation for judges using the
Fourteenth Amendment to elevate unenumerated substantive rights to
constitutional status. Importantly, judges have not given meaning to the
notion of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment merely because
they feel they “owe” something to the constitutional text.81 Rather, judges
bring broad notions of liberty to the text based on their own conceptions of
rights, informed by social norms, history, the common law, and beliefs about
personal autonomy from government overreach.82
While relegated to the anticanon of constitutional law, Lochner v. New
York83 is unquestionably the building block of modern substantive due
process.84 The distinctive feature of Lochner’s essential holding—that New
York could not impose certain wage and hour labor regulations because of a
fundamental right to freedom of contract85—was that the Court focused on
the liberty interest presented by the party bringing a claim against an
allegedly intrusive government act.86 That basic methodology remains a
cornerstone of substantive due process cases. However, Lochner’s oftcriticized jurisprudential policy move was to exclusively find economic
liberty interests, such as contract and property, with no regard for
constitutional text or history.87 To many, and notably Justice Oliver Wendall
Holmes Jr. in his dissent, Lochner represented an activist Court reading an
economic philosophy into the Constitution without any textual or historical
support.88 Just as Lochner’s basic weighing of the government’s interest in
regulation against the liberty interest endures in today’s substantive due
process doctrine, so too do Holmes’s criticisms of judicial policymaking. In
other words, throughout the history of substantive due process, there is a
familiar dichotomy between deploying a balancing test to announce new
rights or refraining from such drastic action unless there is clear textual and
historical support.
However, while the Court began to move away from, and would eventually
abandon, a fundamental right to contract, it also began retooling the doctrine
79. Compare Joshua D. Hawley, Intellectual Origins of (Modern) Substantive Due
Process, 93 TEX. L. REV. 275 (2015), with David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, The
Mainstreaming of Libertarian Constitutionalism, 77 DUKE L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (2015).
80. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1905).
81. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1965).
82. See Bernstein & Somin, supra note 79, at 47.
83. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
84. See David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia,
93 GEO. L.J. 1253, 1274 (2005).
85. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57.
86. See id. at 53; David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10
(2003).
87. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 879 (1987).
88. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 67.
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to focus on the rights of individuals and their privacy against government
overreach. In Meyer v. Nebraska,89 the Court held that the Due Process
Clause protects not just economic rights but the rights “to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of [one’s] own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.”90 Meyer, which concerned a challenge to
a Nebraska law that restricted foreign language education, introduced another
component essential to modern substantive due process doctrine: it found
that even though ensuring English proficiency was a laudable policy goal,
the means used to accomplish that end were unconstitutional because of the
liberty interest at stake.91 In other words, the Court expanded the doctrine to
scrutinize the policy tools used by states to accomplish facially constitutional
ends when the legislation in question involved a protected liberty interest.
This move, while decried as an infringement on state sovereignty and
federalism,92 is important for plaintiffs seeking to assert a liberty interest
against the government because it allows the court to move beyond the facial
text of a policy to examine the motivation of the policy makers.93
While the Court repudiated the doctrine in the New Deal era and
substantive due process was absent from the Court’s constitutional decisions
for some time, the doctrine returned for good in 1965.94 In Griswold, the
Court found an unenumerated right to privacy via the Due Process Clause.95
While Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the majority, claimed that he
had merely identified this right within the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights
and had not created a new substantive right altogether, modern scholars agree
in near unanimity that Griswold is a substantive due process case.96
Over the next several decades, the Court began to recognize other
protected liberty interests, including abortion97 and interracial marriage.98 In
these early cases, the Court followed a strict formula: it would either find a
right fundamental and would subject it to strict scrutiny, or it would find that
a right was not fundamental and would apply a highly deferential rational
basis test.99 However, this test is far from the only one the Court has used,
89. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
90. Id. at 399.
91. See id. at 398.
92. See Lide E. Paterno, Note, Federalism, Due Process, and Equal Protection:
Stereoscopic Synergy in Bond and Windsor, 100 VA. L. REV. 1819, 1824 (2014) (noting that
the concepts of federalism—the division of power between state and federal governments—
and fundamental rights protection can appear to be competing).
93. See Timothy Sandefur, Why Substantive Due Process Makes Sense, CATO UNBOUND
(Feb.
6,
2012),
https://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/02/06/timothy-sandefur/whysubstantive-due-process-makes-sense [https://perma.cc/842J-WVGW] (describing why and
how plaintiffs bring substantive due process claims).
94. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
95. Id. at 481–82.
96. See Bernstein & Somin, supra note 79, at 58.
97. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
98. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
99. See Sunstein, supra note 87, at 877–78.
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and, accordingly, the Court has struggled to articulate a bright-line rule for
the circuits.100
Several elements of Lochner and the early substantive due process cases
have vanished, probably for good. For one, the Court no longer recognizes
economic rights as fundamental, though there has been a Lochner-revision
movement.101 For another, in an effort to bolster the Court’s legitimacy and
demonstrate judicial restraint, the modern Court has trended towards
grounding substantive due process decisions with a textual hook, although it
has continued to depart from the methodology on some major cases,
including Obergefell.102 However, the pre–New Deal Court and the modern
Court still present a similar dichotomy: on the one hand, the Court seems to
be elevating certain classes of rights by deploying a balancing test and, for
the rest of the asserted liberty interests, using a formalistic approach.103
Finally, this test, when tied to history and tradition, attempts to be objective
but can become unbound from objectivity when new rights are elevated
without any textual hook or historical significance.
C. Substantive Due Process Methodology
The Court has deployed a number of tests when evaluating substantive due
process claims and has utilized different methodologies to determine whether
a fundamental right or protected liberty interest exists. In exploring these
methodologies, this section first looks at Roe v. Wade and its progeny as the
building blocks of the modern personal liberties cases. Next, it briefly
discusses conservative pushback on Roe, specifically against its purported
lack of constitutional grounding for elevating unenumerated rights, and the
implications for the democratic process and the Court’s legitimacy. From
there, this section introduces the fact that there are now two distinct forms of
substantive due process. For decisions implicating sexual autonomy and
privacy, the Court uses a harms test while applying an advanced form of
rational basis, also known as rational basis with bite. At the same time, the
Court has embraced a test that frames the right narrowly and only vindicates
it if the liberty interest is supported by history and tradition.104 This section
describes the importance of how the Court frames the right at issue and the
different considerations and factors the Court weighs, including the asserted
state interest relative to the states’ powers.
Finally, this section discusses the particulars of Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s approach to substantive due process in the LGBTQIA+ rights
cases and what it means for state regulations and legislation predicated on
100. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the different tests for substantive
due process).
101. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE 103 (1995) (contending that Lochner was not about economic rights but an
opposition to class legislation or special interest legislation).
102. See GILLMAN, supra note 101, at 103.
103. See Sunstein, supra note 87, at 880.
104. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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bare morals. This section discusses how the Court dealt with the asserted
state interest and what, if at all, it means to the future of the doctrine.
One of the substantive due process doctrine’s defining and controversial
characteristics, which has significant implications for the regulation of sex
toys, is the confusing and inconsistent way the Court has applied it. This
section tracks the development of the methodology and identifies the
different jurisprudential policy concerns that judges look to when presented
with a liberty claim.
By the time the Supreme Court heard Roe, the Court had clearly repudiated
Lochner and lived in fear of returning to its approach to substantive due
process.105 At the same time, the Court sought a way to insulate
unenumerated substantive rights from government overreach.106 However,
the doctrine was complicated and unclear.
Griswold set the groundwork for finding substantive rights to privacy and
intimacy.107 In Griswold, the Court considered Connecticut’s criminal
prohibition on contraceptives.108 The Court defined the liberty interest in
Griswold as the “intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician’s
role in one aspect of that relation.”109 Although the Court decided the case
using the so-called “penumbral analysis,” which vindicated liberty rights
based on their relationship to the Bill of Rights, Griswold embraced the
process of finding constitutionally protected liberty interests using the
Fourteenth Amendment.110 Two other aspects of the Griswold holding are
significant: First, physicians and birth control providers had standing to
assert the liberty interests of individual users of the products.111 Second, the
recognized right to marry carried with it other liberty interests, such as
privacy and intimacy, detached from procreation.112 The clearest articulation
of substantive due process methodology came in a concurrence by Justice
John Marshall Harlan. Building on his dissent in Palko v. Connecticut,113
Justice Harlan contended that incorporation did not limit the Due Process
Clause to the penumbras of the Bill of Rights and that the question posed
must be whether the right asserted is one “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.”114 While this is the most famous line of Harlan’s concurrence, he
also responded to Justices Hugo Black and Potter Stewart, who felt that the
penumbral analysis provided the judicial restraint so lacking in the Lochner
era.115 To them he said:
105. See Bernstein, supra note 84, at 1256.
106. See Hawley, supra note 79, at 284.
107. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
108. Id. at 480.
109. Id. at 482.
110. Id. at 484.
111. Id. at 480–81.
112. Id. at 485.
113. 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (finding that the Due Process Clause incorporated the Fifth
Amendment against the states).
114. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at
325).
115. Id.
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Judicial self-restraint will not, I suggest, be brought about in the “due
process area” by the historically unfounded incorporation formula long
advanced by my Brother[s] . . . . It will be achieved in this area, as in other
constitutional areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the
teaching of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of
federalism and separation of powers have played in preserving American
freedoms.116

Justice Harlan’s words have proven to be immensely influential for the
Court, regardless of ideology. For those who have taken an expansive view
of substantive due process, Justice Harlan’s broad conceptions of liberty
touch Roe and were explicitly at work years later117 when the Court sustained
the abortion right in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.118 For those who take a narrower view of substantive due process,
history and tradition are the starting and ending points for finding a
substantive due process right, and principles of federalism are crucial to
democratic order.119 Further, even though the majority opinion is grounded
in the penumbral analysis, the Court states that the privacy described in
Griswold is promised by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.120
After Griswold, Justice Harry Blackmun expanded the substantive due
process doctrine with his majority opinion in Roe, in which he clarified that
the pertinent privacy interest—the right to an abortion—encompassed more
than just the right to be left alone.121 Justice Blackmun said the right of
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment was about the right to be free from
government influence when making life-changing moral decisions.122 The
private place Roe protected was not the bedroom or the home but the moral
sphere where one has a right to make choices and act out those choices
without state interference.123
Roe’s implications, doctrinally and politically, were far-reaching at the
time, and U.S. political culture continues to battle over the result.124 While
116. See id. at 501.
117. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Justice Harlan for the proposition that the definition of “liberty” is necessarily
ambiguous); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848–50 (1992)
(joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 497, 542 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
118. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
119. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The notion that a constitutional provision that
guarantees only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could define
the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of words.”).
120. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500.
121. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 169.
122. See id. at 140.
123. Id.
124. See Sabrina Tavernise et al., Roe v. Wade, Part 2: The Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES
(July 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/24/podcasts/the-daily/roe-wadeabortion.html [https://perma.cc/4YDH-5RTT] (discussing the wide-ranging impacts of the
Roe decision).
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it signaled the Court’s openness to a doctrine of liberty that vindicated
individual rights in the public and private spheres, it also spawned a fierce
political movement that engendered pushback from a number of judges and
commentators.125 Indeed, as conservative judges skeptical of the doctrine
joined the Court, they sought a method to retool the doctrine to promote
judicial self-restraint.126
In 1986, thirteen years after Roe, Bowers v. Hardwick127 considered the
constitutionality of a Georgia statute that outlawed “sodomy,” defined as oral
or anal sex between consenting adults.128 The opinion, penned by Justice
Byron White, backed away from Roe’s broad conceptions of autonomy when
framing the liberty interest.129 Instead, the Court framed the legal question
as whether the Constitution confers “a fundamental right upon homosexuals
to engage in sodomy.”130 To answer that question, explained Justice White,
the petitioner must show “that a right to engage in such conduct is ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.’”131
For the Justices who take a strict view of substantive due process, these
two methodological moves are absolute necessities. For one, by narrowly
tailoring the right, the Court limited its risk of ushering in dramatic social
change. The consequences of judicially crafted social change have long been
a chief concern of substantive due process critics. For example, in Roe,
Justice William Rehnquist cautioned that the advent of judge-made policy
would delegitimize the Court.132 Former D.C. Court of Appeals judge and
unsuccessful Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork made a similar point in
his book The Tempting of America.133 In a related vein, Chief Justice Roberts
argued that by framing the liberty interest broadly in Obergefell, the Court
was unjustly taking the gay marriage question out of the democratic
process.134 To Chief Justice Roberts, framing the liberty interest at its most
granular level is the only way the Court can preserve its role deciding cases
and controversies without stepping into the role of state legislatures.135
Second, while Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion focused on political process,
Justice Alito’s dissent demonstrates that by demanding that the narrowly
tailored right be supported by history and tradition, the Court can attempt to
125. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 95 (1990).
126. See, e.g., Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 47 (1986) (statement of Hon Antonin Scalia, J., U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit; to be U.S. Supreme Court Associate J.).
127. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
128. Id. at 188.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 190.
131. Id. at 194 (first quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1976); and then
quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
132. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (comparing the
decision to Lochner).
133. See BORK, supra note 125, at 204–05.
134. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
135. Id.
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align the asserted liberty with an originalist understanding of the
Constitution.136
Finally, following Roe, the Court found another occasion to consider this
controversial and expansive methodology.137 In Casey, the Court considered
a challenge to a Pennsylvania statute that placed a number of restrictions on
the ability of women to obtain an abortion, such as requiring spousal
notification and a mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting period.138 While
reaffirming the central holding of Roe, the Court embraced its expansive
methodology.139 The joint opinion by Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and
Souter rejected the strict history and tradition test deployed in Bowers and
instead boiled the judge’s role in a substantive due process case down to a
single broad standard: reasoned judgment.140 Further, the plurality also
explained that the liberty interest at stake in the case was not the specific
activity of abortion but the right to make personal choices crucial to defining
one’s own identity free from government intrusion.141 Connecting the issue
to abortion, the Court explained that what Roe sought to protect—and what
Casey was upholding—was a woman’s fundamental liberty to make
decisions about her reproductive activity.142 What is more, for liberty
interests so central to the conception of self, there is no procedure—however
fair—that the state may use to deprive an individual of that liberty.143
Today, the Supreme Court has simultaneously recognized two competing
methodologies for finding a liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment.
The conservative methodology is most clearly articulated, and was officially
adopted for substantive due process cases, in Glucksberg.144 There, the
Court deployed a similar methodology to the one used in Bowers and held
that the Court would find a substantive due process right and apply strict
scrutiny only if the right was deeply rooted in the nation’s history and
tradition and carefully described.145 In Glucksberg, the Court considered
whether individuals had a fundamental right to end their own lives.146
Answering the history question, the Court looked to centuries of “selfmurder” law in the United States and other western democracies.147 The
Court traced the historical treatment of suicide and assisted suicide through
common and statutory law and concluded that there was a deep-rooted
tradition of its criminalization.148 Further, the Court examined current state
136. Id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting).
137. Roe, 410 U.S. at 173.
138. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
139. Id. at 847–48.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 521 U.S. 702, 710–11 (1997) (discussing the framework for the due process inquiry).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 705.
147. Id. at 712 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189).
148. Id. at 710–13.
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laws related to assisted suicide to demonstrate the robust public debate on the
topic and illustrate that the democratic process was at work to resolve it.149
Framing the legal question, the Court went to the most granular level, saying
that the “careful description” in this case was whether “the protections of the
Due Process Clause include a right to commit suicide.”150
This description, while accurate, is far from the totality of the liberty
interest actually at stake. For instance, the Court could have asked about endof-life decisions, the rights of the terminally ill, and so forth.151 Finally, in
addition to narrowly tailoring the right and looking to history and legal
traditions, the Court also looked to democratic alternatives for answering the
question.152 In her concurrence, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote:
“There is no reason to think the democratic process will not strike the proper
balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally competent
individuals who would seek to end their suffering, and the State’s interests in
protecting those who might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure.”153
The Glucksberg methodology held itself out to be a final articulation of
the Court’s substantive due process methodology. For its supporters, it
finally provided a bright-line rule that would defer most issues to the political
branches and provide judicial restraint.154 For its detractors, however, it
trivialized the right at stake and was circular in its reasoning.155 For example,
by requiring that the liberty interest be one that is deeply rooted, the Court
was signaling that it would only protect long-standing interests, leaving
modern invasions of liberty unprotected.
At the same time that Glucksberg stood as one formulation of the Court’s
substantive due process methodology, a separate doctrine began to emerge
for sexual liberties cases. In 1996, the Court revisited LGBTQIA+ rights
issues for the first time since Bowers in Romer v. Evans.156 The case
concerned a Colorado state constitutional amendment that prohibited
municipalities from passing antidiscrimination statutes for gay men and
lesbians beyond what the state already provided.157 Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy found that the provision violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it showed “animus” to a
politically unpopular group.158 Further, while the Court did not hold that gay
people are a protected class and subject to strict scrutiny, the Court found that
the law failed rational basis scrutiny.159 Significantly, this was a form of
149. Id. at 735.
150. Id. at 724 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
151. See Diana Hassel, Sex and Death: Lawrence’s Liberty and Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1003, 1004–09 (2007).
152. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710.
153. Id. at 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
154. See Hawley, supra note 79, at 290.
155. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Washington v. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, 106
MICH. L. REV. 1501, 1504–07 (2008).
156. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
157. See id. at 624.
158. Id. at 632.
159. See id.
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rational basis that was unrecognizable when compared to the highly
deferential review applied in most cases.160 While rational basis review is
traditionally highly deferential, this version was searching, looking into
pretext.
While not a substantive due process case, Romer is important to sexual
liberty jurisprudence because it attacks the idea of morality as an independent
justification for legislation aimed at a politically unpopular group and
suggests that rational basis in this context is a less deferential standard than
it is in other contexts. By finding that the Colorado state constitutional
amendment failed even rational basis review, the Court was elevating not
only minority groups but also the type of liberty the government was trying
to restrict—autonomy and independence from government overreach.
Lawrence signaled a significant change in substantive due process
methodology for sexual liberties cases. In Lawrence, the Court considered a
Texas state sodomy law similar to the one previously found constitutional in
Bowers. Lawrence is significant in its methodological approach and its
practical implications for groups targeted by morals legislation, such as those
who use sex toys, and the extent to which the government may regulate these
groups’ liberty. Justice Kennedy’s opinion clarified that due process
concerns are implicated by any regulation of “the most private human
conduct, sexual behavior,”161 in “the most private of places, the home.”162
Overruling Bowers, Kennedy began with the historical analysis that
animates Glucksberg but found that, for cases implicating intimacy, the
historical analysis is the starting point but not “the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry.”163 Justice Kennedy also indicated that in
intimacy cases, framing the right narrowly is also inappropriate, writing: “To
say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would
demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right
to have sexual intercourse.”164 In looking beyond the mere sexual interest
involved, the Court said that “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in
a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”165
Finally, the Court made another important move, confirming that the type
of intimacy and sexuality protected by the Fourteenth Amendment goes
beyond decisions implicating child-rearing, finding that personal decisions
“concerning the intimacies of . . . physical relationship[s], even when not
intended to produce offspring, are a form of liberty protected by the Due
160. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (“It is no
requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.”).
161. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 572 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
164. Id. at 567.
165. Id.
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Process Clause.”166 The Court also cited a long line of substantive due
process cases, including Griswold, for the proposition that there is something
different about the sphere of liberty implicated by state action regulating
sexuality.167
Interestingly, while overturning Bowers and finding that the states’ interest
in regulating morality was insufficient to justify the intrusive regulation, the
court did not elevate sex, intimacy, sexual orientation, or sexual autonomy to
fundamental right status.168 Instead, the Court found that the Texas statute
failed some form of rational basis review that it did not define.169 However,
the Court did mention that the right implicated in Lawrence did not impact
minors, cause injury or coercion, or involve any conduct spilling into the
public forum, suggesting that these factors would implicate valid government
interests.170 Thus, the Court may have been implying that for regulation of
sexual autonomy, the test is harm.171 If a state is able to demonstrate that the
activity causes a cognizable harm, then the activity may be regulated.172 On
the other hand, if the activity is purely personal and consensual, it would fail
this version of rational basis review.173
D. Morals Legislation
Since the nation’s founding, the government has used morality to justify
legislation and regulation. In the early colonial period, blasphemy,
homosexuality, rejecting Christianity, and disobeying one’s parents were
offenses punishable by death.174 In early U.S. history, legal proscriptions
based on common conceptions of morality were common, even essential,
elements of local government.175 However, public morality was defined by
a local, rather than national, consensus and, thus, the intrusiveness of
legislation varied greatly by state.176 Prior to the ratification of the
166. Id. at 578 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick , 478 U.S.186, 216 (1986), overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
167. Id. at 564–65.
168. See id. at 578.
169. See Matthew J. Clark, Comment, Rational Relation to What?: How Lawrence v.
Texas Destroyed Our Understanding of What Constitutes a Legitimate State Interest, 6
LIBERTY U. L. REV. 415, 416 (2012).
170. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
171. See Ilya Shapiro & Devin Watkins, Adult Rights for Adult Businesses, CATO INST.:
CATO AT LIBERTY (Apr. 18, 2017, 2:32 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/adult-rights-adultbusinesses [https://perma.cc/N8D6-C9CZ].
172. See Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Note, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When
Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2078–97 (2016) (explaining rational basis
review).
173. Id.
174. See generally THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS (photo. reprt. 1998)
(1648) (describing capital punishment for certain offenses predicated on morals).
175. See Daniel F. Piar, Morality as a Legitimate Government Interest, 117 PENN ST. L.
REV. 139, 141–42 (2012) (discussing the history of morals legislation).
176. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 442–43 (1827) (coining the term
“police power” and situating morality within those powers); see also Santiago Legarre, The
Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 781 (2007) (detailing
the history of the police power in the United States as primarily regulatory and local).
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Fourteenth Amendment, the states’ police powers were at their apex, as the
federal government was largely unable to influence state law.177
Since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the expansion of
the Commerce Clause, the federal government has had a much larger role in
shaping the landscape of state laws. This includes the power of the federal
courts to scrutinize state laws for compliance with the Fourteenth
Amendment.178
In modern terms, morals legislation can be generally defined as a law or
regulation that prohibits or encourages certain conduct or associations based
on a normative belief about how individuals should live their lives.179
However, morals legislation is circumscribed by, among other things, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause,180 which mandate that all laws must serve a primarily
secular purpose.181 Further, as the Court has grappled with public morals
legislation, it has struggled to articulate a specific test for determining which
issues are legitimate state interests. On the one hand, laws that burden First
Amendment expression, freedom of contract, and personal liberty may
nevertheless further a recognized state interest when they aim to protect
minors182 or other parties vulnerable to coercion. Along these lines, laws
banning sex in public have been upheld as furthering a valid government
interest.183
For instance, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,184 the Court said that it
“implicitly accepted that a legislature could legitimately act on” the state’s
belief that pornography is connected to antisocial behavior “to protect the
social interest in order and morality.”185 Further, as Justice Antonin Scalia
noted in Lawrence, because morality is viewed by some on the Court as the
paradigmatic expression of the values and will of the people through their
elected representatives, the Court should be hesitant to wade into the policy
tools used by the legislature to effectuate that goal.186 Additionally, citizens
who view public morals legislation as government overreach have the

177. See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV
429, 433–34 (2004) (describing the Fourteenth Amendment’s limiting effect on state powers).
178. See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies against state action).
179. See Chemerinsky, supra note 155, at 142.
180. See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 743, 744 n.6 (1976) (finding laws
that are excessively tangled with religion unconstitutional).
181. U.S. CONST. amend I.; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 603, 612–13 (1971)
(interpreting the Establishment Clause as including a secular purpose requirement).
182. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (noting that the unconstitutional
Texas sodomy law was not about minors).
183. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (defining “obscene material” as
that which is without “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific” value).
184. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
185. Id. at 61 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1957)).
186. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559–60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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opportunity to elect new leaders at the state and federal levels every several
years, thus providing a further check on such legislation.187
On the other hand, the Court has met public morals legislation with
mounting skepticism and has been increasingly amenable to evaluating
legislatures’ motivations and the effects of laws on politically unpopular
groups.188 Further, as far back as 1969, the Court found that the “poisoning”
of the minds of individuals who watch or consume obscene material in the
privacy of their own homes is an insufficient morality interest.189 In the
Fourteenth Amendment context, the Court has looked to legislative history
and the effects on certain classes and has struck down laws borne of animus
toward a certain class under rational basis review.190 In U.S. Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno,191 the Court considered the constitutionality of the
Department of Agriculture’s food stamp regulations, which denied benefits
to otherwise eligible persons living with at least one unrelated person, finding
the exclusion unconstitutional.192 While setting limits and regulations for the
administration of a social welfare program is well within Congress’s
purview, the Court struck down the law under rational basis review because
the Act’s legislative history demonstrated that it was intended to prevent
“hippies” from accessing the program.193 In finding that the Act violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment,194 the Court ruled that
morality borne of animus toward a politically unpopular group is not a
constitutional exercise of power.195
Finally, in United States v. Windsor,196 the Court further explained the
limits of morals legislation and, specifically, laws that burden intimate
choices. The Windsor Court found that the federal definition of marriage as
a marriage between one man and one woman, as codified by DOMA, violated
the Fifth Amendment.197 Importantly, the Court found that while DOMA
did not interfere with a gay couple’s sexual intimacy, the provision excluding
their relationships from the definition of marriage “demean[ed] the couple[s],
whose moral and sexual choices the constitution protects.”198 Thus, Windsor
suggests that laws limiting the moral choices of citizens may be incompatible
with the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment.
187. See Max J. Rosenthal, What Are the Midterm Elections?, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018,
12:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/11/05/what-are-midterm-elections
[https://perma.cc/B9CD-GVK4].
188. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582–83 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
189. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
190. See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 898
(2012).
191. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
192. Id. at 529.
193. Id. at 536–38.
194. Under the doctrine of reverse incorporation, the Court has incorporated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment into the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v.
Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954).
195. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
196. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
197. Id. at 774.
198. Id. at 772.
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E. Obergefell v. Hodges
After both the Fifth Circuit, in Reliable Consultants, Inc., and the Eleventh
Circuit, in Williams, took different views on sex toy regulations, the
Obergefell Court legalized same-sex marriage federally. In Obergefell,
decided twelve years after Lawrence, the Court expanded on its methodology
for personal intimacy cases.199 Obergefell concerned a number of lawsuits
filed in states that prohibited or failed to recognize same-sex marriage.200
Generally speaking, a majority of the states that prohibited same-sex
marriage did so on a few related morality-based grounds: (1) that states
should protect traditional definitions of marriage as a moral institution; (2)
that states have a legitimate interest in promoting procreation; and (3) that
allowing same-sex marriage would be a slippery slope to permitting more
immoral activity, such as polygamy and bestiality.201
From the start, Justice Kennedy framed the right at issue broadly, looking
to the rights of all persons, regardless of sexual orientation, to define
themselves and set the parameters of their relationships.202 Clearly, personal
autonomy is a key feature of Justice Kennedy’s substantive due process
decisions.203 Further, he described the importance of the institution of
marriage as an independent liberty interest, as well as the implication
marriage has on other interests, such as child-rearing, self-empowerment,
self-expression, and the institution of the family.204 Importantly, Justice
Kennedy also built on Lawrence to articulate the heightened importance of
individual autonomy cases and the broader methodology they require.205
Responding to claims that the Court should follow Glucksberg, framing the
right at issue narrowly and exclusively relying on history and tradition, he
wrote that “while that approach may have been appropriate for the asserted
right there involved . . . , it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has
used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and
intimacy.”206 Further, “[i]f rights were defined by who exercised them in the
past, then received practices could serve as their own continued justification
and new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”207 Significantly, this
signaled that the Court might alter and expand its analysis if an asserted
liberty interest is grounded in intimacy and that Glucksberg was not the
Court’s final articulation of substantive due process methodology.

199. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590–600 (2015) (discussing the history
of the right to marriage and the Fourteenth Amendment).
200. See id.
201. See Kim Forde-Mazruti, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex
Marriage, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 285 (2011).
202. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597.
203. See supra Part I.D.
204. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
205. See id. at 2599.
206. See id. at 2602.
207. Id.
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While the Obergefell opinion is rife with lofty language and broad
propositions,208 Justice Kennedy introduces new elements into his
methodology, building on Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor. For one,
Kennedy still relied on history as a starting point, looking to the broadening
conceptions of marriage between men and women as well as the rights of gay
people generally.209 For another, he looked to consensus, both in the United
States and in other western democracies, on what marriage means.210
Interestingly, he reframed the consensus point, looking not merely to
legislative intent but also to studies, scientific consensus, and perceived
social attitudes.211 In other words, Justice Kennedy did not restrict his
analysis to the existing legal definitions of marriage in the United States and
around the world; he also considered how science and culture were beginning
to define the concept.212 Finally, he looked to the relationship between due
process and equal protection, inferring that a right is more easily understood
as fundamental if burdening that right based on a suspect classification—or
one that has been treated with intermediate or heightened scrutiny—would
offend equal protection.213
Justice Kennedy also expanded on morality as a justification for state
restrictions on sexual liberty. Although Justice Kennedy did not make the
same explicit reference to morality in Obergefell that he did in Lawrence, his
discussion of the evolution of societal standards and mores, and how their
progression shifts constitutional understandings, implies that traditional
conceptions of morality may not continue to serve as a rational basis for
legislation.214 Further, by clarifying that the Due Process Clause protects a
right to marriage and intimacy that is “fundamental”215 and that the right of
marriage and intimacy is closely related to other fundamental rights such as
child-rearing and education, the Obergefell opinion challenged many of the
traditional areas involving morals legislation.216 Finally, while Justice Scalia
ominously warned that Lawrence marked “the end of all morals
legislation,”217 Obergefell did not plunge a knife into the wound of morals
208. See, e.g., id. at 2593 (“The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach . . . .”);
see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[The]
historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . may be somewhat inconsistent with our past
decisions in this area. On occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting
asserted rights at [a higher] level[] of generality . . . . I would not foreclose the unanticipated
by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis.” (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 542, 544 (1961))).
209. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593–97.
210. See id. at 2596.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 2602–03.
214. Id. at 2589 (discussing changes in public attitudes and knowledge about
homosexuality).
215. Id. at 2584, 2602, 2606.
216. See William N. Eskridge Jr., The Marriage Equality Cases and Constitutional Theory,
2014–2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 111, 115.
217. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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legislation as Scalia predicted. It did, however, question many of the grounds
and assumptions on which morals legislation rests.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON RIGHTS AND METHODOLOGY
Two circuits have ruled, with differing results, on whether the protection
afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment extends to the possession or sale of
sex toys. In Reliable Consultants, Inc., the Fifth Circuit found that a Texas
law banning the sale of sex toys violated the Fourteenth Amendment on
substantive due process grounds. Four years earlier, in Williams, the
Eleventh Circuit ruled that criminalizing the possession of sex toys does not
infringe any fundamental right related to privacy or sexual autonomy and,
therefore, that state regulations banning their sale are subject only to an
exceedingly deferential rational basis review, which the court found Alabama
had met.218 This split of authority is due, in large part, to the shifting
methodologies for framing substantive due process rights and divergent
opinions as to which previous substantive due process cases are applicable
precedent. Importantly, both cases were decided after Lawrence but before
Obergefell.219 Thus, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits looked to drastically
different methodologies—both recognized by the Supreme Court—to define
the liberty interest at stake and the test used to evaluate government
regulations.
Part II.A of this Note discusses Reliable Consultants, Inc. and examines
the role Lawrence played in shaping the court’s conception of liberty and
permissible government regulations of sexuality and autonomy. Part II.B
discusses Williams and examines how the court minimized the methodology
used in Lawrence in favor of the test articulated in Glucksberg.
A. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle
In Reliable Consultants, Inc., the plaintiff, a Texas boutique that sold a
number of intimate devices, sought to invalidate a Texas state statutory
provision prohibiting the sale and advertising of sexual devices.220 The
obscenity statute at issue was enacted in 1973 with the goal of keeping
“obscene materials” from reaching the marketplace.221 As it pertains to sex
toys, the statute criminalized the sale or advertising of any device “designed
or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital
organs.”222 While the plaintiffs223 contended that the Texas statute violated
a broad liberty interest in privacy and intimacy, Texas argued that the
218. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1249–50 (11th Cir. 2004).
219. Lawrence was decided in 2003, while Obergefell was announced in 2015.
220. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 739 (5th Cir. 2008).
221. See id. at 740.
222. Id. at 750–51 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(7) (West 1979), invalidated
by Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d 738).
223. The plaintiff in Reliable Consultants, Inc. was a distribution company. Id. at 741–42.
Considering whether they had standing, the court cited the birth control cases of the 1960s for
the proposition that vendors may assert the liberty interests of their customers. See id. at 743
(citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 683–91 (1977)).

220

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

regulation was rationally related to its interest in “discouraging prurient
interests in autonomous sex . . . and prohibiting the commercial sale of
sex.”224
As in any substantive due process case, the Fifth Circuit was tasked with
identifying the liberty interest and then applying the appropriate
constitutional test to the state’s regulation of that interest. First, the court
engaged extensively with the practical uses and necessities of sex toys.225
The court recognized a variety of reasons for the use of sex toys, including
to meet therapeutic needs, assert personal desires, and avoid premarital
intercourse.226 The court also addressed Texas’s argument that the plaintiff,
as a distributor, did not have standing to assert the rights of individual sex
toy users.227 Answering that question, the court analogized sex toys to
contraception, as in Griswold, which held that restricting commercial
transactions unconstitutionally infringes on an individual’s right.228
In its brief, Texas offered a narrow reading of the liberty interest at issue
in Reliable Consultants, Inc., defining it as the “right to stimulate one’s
genitals for non-medical purposes unrelated to procreation or outside of an
interpersonal relationship.”229 However, the Fifth Circuit defined the liberty
interest broadly as “the individual right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
engage in private intimate conduct in the home without government
intrusion.”230
The court framed this right using its reading of Lawrence.231 It engaged
with Lawrence’s reasoning, concluding that the right Lawrence recognized
was not the sexual act itself but the right to be free from government intrusion
when making intimate decisions.232 Further, the Fifth Circuit also took cues
from Lawrence’s dismissal of Bowers.233 The court found that in Lawrence,
the Supreme Court recognized that in cases such as these, where sexual
liberty is asserted as a right, defining the liberty interest as the specific act
itself would trivialize the right.234 Thus, the Reliable Consultants, Inc. court
did not narrowly tailor the right to the specific use of sex toys but asked if
penalizing the use of sex toys violated the recognized liberty right to make
private decisions about consensual intimacy in the home.235 Specifically, the
Fifth Circuit read Lawrence as concluding that the sodomy law at issue
violated the Fourteenth Amendment not because of a specific fundamental
right to engage in sodomy but because the sodomy law more broadly violated
224. Id. at 745 (quoting Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott’s Appellee’s Brief, supra
note 67, at 7–8).
225. Id. at 742.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 743.
229. Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott’s Appellee’s Brief, supra note 67, at 15.
230. See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 742–43.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 743–44.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 742.
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the substantive due process right to engage in consensual intimate conduct in
the home free from government intrusion.236 Thus, according to the Reliable
Consultants, Inc. court, Lawrence instructed that the relevant question to ask
was not whether the right to sex toys is deeply rooted in our nation’s history
and tradition but rather whether Texas’s law criminalizing the sale of sex toys
burdened the recognized constitutional right to make intimate decisions in
the home unencumbered by government interference.
Next, the court had to grapple with which level of scrutiny applied to the
Texas law. As previously mentioned, one of the mysteries of Lawrence is
that it did not categorize the right to sexual privacy or intimacy as a
fundamental right.237 Following Lawrence, the Fifth Circuit did not find a
fundamental right to sexual privacy or to sex toys.238 Likewise, it did not
employ typical rational basis review.239 Instead, the Fifth Circuit looked at
the governmental interests found constitutionally insufficient in Lawrence
and applied them to sex toys.240
In both Lawrence and Reliable Consultants, Inc., the states’ arguments
were morality-based: the statutes in question represented the moral
judgments of the legislatures. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that if
morality was an insufficient justification for restricting consensual sodomy,
then “public morality also cannot serve as a rational basis for Texas’s statute,
which also regulates private sexual intimacy.”241
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s methodology in Reliable Consultants, Inc.
was twofold. First, instead of analyzing whether the liberty interest in
question infringed upon a fundamental right, the court looked to whether the
individual liberty interest asserted—there, the implication of sex toys on
sexual liberty—burdened the constitutionally protected realm of private
decision-making.242 This departed from the Glucksberg framework, which
asked whether the specific liberty interest—detached from others—was
worthy of protection on its own.243 The second step was to examine the
burden that the statute placed on that right, accepting that morality alone is
an insufficient state justification.244
B. Williams v. Attorney General
In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar, but narrower, statute.
The Alabama Obscenity Act, which is still in effect, “prohibits . . . the
commercial distribution of ‘any device designed or marketed as useful

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 745.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003).
See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 746.
See id.
Id. at 746–47.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 743.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–11 (1997).
See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 745–46.
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primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs.’”245 But, the law does
not prohibit mere possession or gifting of sex toys, and it allows the sale of
certain devices that may be used as sex toys, so long as they are not primarily
marketed or designed for that use.246 Finally, the law provides a safe harbor
for using sex toys when there is a genuine medical necessity.247
Plaintiffs’ counsel, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), on behalf
of a number of sex toy vendors seeking to operate in Alabama, urged an
expansive reading of the right to use sex toys within a broad right to private
sexual conduct.248 Further, the ACLU argued that Lawrence’s rejection of
public morality as a justification for laws criminalizing consensual sodomy
implies that public morality is likewise an insufficient justification for
criminalizing sex toys.249 Additionally, the ACLU contended that the
Alabama statute burdened a substantive due process right to private sexual
intimacy because it restricted decisions between consenting adults in their
private relationships.250
Alabama, in contrast, took a different view. First, the state argued that
Lawrence did not recognize a new fundamental right but rather rejected
public morals as a justification for laws that burden both private and
noncommercial sexual choices,251 meaning that the sphere of privacy
Lawrence protected was limited to those decisions made between consenting
couples that implicate nothing beyond the four corners of their bedroom.
Further, Alabama professed that reading Lawrence to foreclose justifying
legislation with public morality would be a “radical” departure from legal
and social norms, because all laws, including homicide, are based on a “social
conceptions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong.’”252 Finally, Alabama warned that
bestiality and necrophilia would quickly be legalized because they, too, are
private and sexual acts.253
The Eleventh Circuit considered the liberty interest at stake and the
ACLU’s contention that Lawrence created a broad right to sexual privacy.254
The court recounted a number of instances in which the Supreme Court had
been granted the opportunity to recognize such a broad right but chose not to
do so. Further, the Eleventh Circuit noted that, in Lawrence, the Supreme
Court only established that criminal prohibitions on consensual adult sodomy
245. See Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting ALA. CODE
§ 13A-12-200.2 (Supp. 2003)).
246. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2020).
247. See id.
248. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1233–34.
249. Id. at 1234–35.
250. Id. at 1235.
251. Id. at 1239.
252. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 31–32, Williams, 378 F.3d 1232 (No. 06-11892J) (quoting Williams v. King, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1248 (N.D. Ala. 2006)) (implying that
any general attack on “morals-based laws” threatens the justifications for widely accepted
crimes, such as murder, because such crimes “are premised, fundamentally,
on a shared and inherited public morality”).
253. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 592 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1235–36.
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are unconstitutional, intentionally failing to elevate a new fundamental right.
Also, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it was constrained from
interpreting Lawrence as recognizing a fundamental right, since Lawrence
did not use Glucksberg’s fundamental rights analysis and the Supreme Court
struck down the Texas sodomy law at issue on rational basis review.255 The
Eleventh Circuit also concluded that if the Lawrence majority considered a
broader right at all, it was in scattered dicta and had been “left for another
day.”256
Concluding that Lawrence did not establish a fundamental right that would
trigger strict scrutiny, the Eleventh Circuit then utilized its own Glucksberg
analysis.257 After reciting the history of Lawrence and Glucksberg, it
concluded that the right implicated was the “right to sell and purchase sexual
devices.”258 However, recognizing that prohibiting the distribution of sex
toys infringed upon an individual’s ability to use sex toys, the court also
considered whether the Constitution protects a right to use such devices.259
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit carefully described the right at issue in line with
Glucksberg, aiming to construct a formulation of substantive due process
interests that sought to ensure that the only rights considered or expanded
were those squarely before the court.
The Eleventh Circuit in Williams then turned to Glucksberg’s second
prong—whether the right is deeply rooted in history and tradition and
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.260 Importantly, this analysis was
tightly constrained because of the court’s narrow framing of the issue.261 If,
for instance, the court had framed the issue in terms of sexual privacy or
autonomy, the court could have looked to a wider range of legal and political
traditions that respect the choices of consenting adults. However, by limiting
the right at issue to only the right to use sex toys, the court was more
constrained. The Eleventh Circuit also pointed out that the historical analysis
did not hinge on whether the activity at issue had been observed over the
course of U.S history but rather on whether U.S. laws and legal traditions had
protected a right to use sex toys over the course of U.S. history.262 From
there, the court found that, to the extent that U.S. statutory and common law
had considered sex toys, it had not condoned them and, at times, prohibited
their use. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit in Williams found that the use of
sex toys was not deeply rooted in the nation’s history or traditions.263

255. Id. at 1238 n.8.
256. Id. at 1238.
257. Id. at 1239.
258. Id. at 1242.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1242–43.
261. When the right is described in narrow terms, it limits the scope and scale of the
historical analysis and the considerations incorporated in the analysis. See, e.g., Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 757 (1997).
262. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1243.
263. Id. at 1246.
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The final matter the Eleventh Circuit considered was the government’s
interest in creating a ban on sex toys.264 The court endorsed public morality
as both inherent in the concept of state police powers and the paradigmatic
expression of republican democracy.265 Speaking on the “delicate area of
morals legislation,”266 the court emphasized the role of Alabama’s citizens
in the democratic process and, conversely, warned of the dangers of
snatching the issue from the people and shifting its guardian to “unelected
judges.”267
III. THE BROADER PHILOSOPHY OF THE FIFTH AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS
The Supreme Court has deployed a variety of tests in the substantive due
process arena with varying levels of openness to recognizing new rights.268
This varying methodology is clearly what leads to the divergent results
between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.269 The Fifth Circuit framed the right
at stake broadly and did not restrict its analysis to history and tradition,
finding a zone of sexual privacy within the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept
of liberty that can only be invaded by a compelling interest.270 Conversely,
the Eleventh Circuit framed the right at issue narrowly. The court showed
deference to federalism by recognizing the state’s broad police powers to
criminalize the commercial sale of sex toys and looked to history and
tradition to find that using sex toys is not implicit in our concept of ordered
liberty and therefore not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.271
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court will again consider the boundaries of
substantive due process in the sexual privacy sphere. While the Court may
or may not consider the sex toy issue specifically, the methodology the Court
uses will likely determine the scope of that right. This part considers the
broader ramifications for Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence if the
Supreme Court were to accept either the Fifth Circuit’s or Eleventh Circuits’
methodology. Part III.A considers the philosophy and ramifications of a
methodology similar to that used by the Fifth Circuit in Reliable Consultants,
Inc. Part III.B considers the philosophy and ramifications of a methodology
similar to that used by the Eleventh Circuit in Williams.

264. Id. at 1234.
265. Id. at 1250–53 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 1250.
267. Id.
268. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), and Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), with Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
269. See Bernstein, supra note 84, at 1282 (discussing the importance of methodology).
270. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 746–47 (5th Cir. 2008).
271. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239–46.
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A. Ramifications of the Fifth Circuit’s Methodology
The Fifth Circuit, in Reliable Consultants, Inc., supported a broad reading
of Fourteenth Amendment liberty in the sexual privacy context.272 If the
Supreme Court were to embrace a methodology aligned with the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation of Lawrence, the most far-reaching consequence
would be an explicit recognition of a fundamental right to sexual privacy and
autonomy. Furthermore, when facing claims predicated on this right, the
Court would not be restrained by “narrowly tailoring” the right and ensuring
that it is “deeply rooted” in our nation’s history and tradition. Instead, the
Court would apply a heightened form of rational basis—not the restrained
jurist approach of Judge Bork, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and
Chief Justice Roberts—but closer to the reasoned judgement described by
Justice Robert Jackson.
In Lawrence and Obergefell, the Court refrained from explicitly
recognizing a right to sexual privacy.273 However, Lawrence acknowledges
that Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers was the better decision, and Reliable
Consultants, Inc. explicitly relies on it as a key part of the jurisprudential
groundwork for its holdings.274 Therefore, if the Supreme Court were to
embrace the Reliable Consultants, Inc. methodology, Justice Stevens’s
Bowers dissent may be insightful for how such a methodology would operate
in practice. He begins his analysis with two significant propositions.
First, Justice Stevens proposed that the fact that a majority of a state finds
a particular practice immoral is not, on its own, a sufficient justification for
prohibiting the practice.275 Crucially, this is the clearest statement from the
Court that public morality is not a sufficient stand-alone justification for
infringing on the personal liberties of consenting adults’ private sexual
experiences.276 Second, he asserted that individuals’ decisions concerning
their intimate relationships—whether married or unmarried and whether
intended to produce offspring or not—are a protected form of liberty under
the Due Process Clause.277 Again, this is significant because, for Justice
Stevens, the right to intimacy precedes a substantive due process right.278
Thus, the question is not whether any individual activity which may implicate
intimate relationships is itself fundamental but rather whether it can properly
be related to the existing liberty interest in private intimacy.279 Finally,
Justice Stevens explains that the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging

272. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744 (discussing the wide parameters of the
substantive due process right to sexual intimacy).
273. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 550; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600–
01 (2015).
274. See supra Part I.D.
275. See supra Part I.D.
276. See supra Part I.D.
277. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled
by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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and, to a certain extent, defining the parameters of relationships.280
However, he also explains that the state’s interest ends when those couples
are in private because the way they choose to conduct their intimate
expression is not a matter for the state.281
The Reliable Consultants, Inc. court added to the analysis in two
significant ways. First, after recognizing the right described by Justice
Stevens, it focused its analysis on the burden the statute places “on the
individual’s right to make private decisions about consensual intimate
conduct.”282 This is significant because it guides courts to look beyond the
individual practice at hand and analyze the prohibition’s impact on the
protected right: intimate decision-making.283 Second, while the court
explicitly rejected public morality as a sufficient justification for the law, it
viewed the justification in light of legitimate interests in infringing on
intimate decision-making, such as when it implicates minors, coercion,
public conduct, or prostitution.284 Therefore, the Reliable Consultants, Inc.
court pushed back on the fear of a slippery slope or overly expansive right by
establishing a harm principle.
This analysis would also be in line with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Obergefell.285 Obergefell introduced two ideas that could be dispositive of
the issue of sex toys specifically and of future substantive due process cases
more broadly. First, Obergefell’s reliance on consensus and societal attitudes
would likely push the Court toward finding that bans on sex toys violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, as the United States and other western democracies
have adopted increasingly progressive views of sexuality and, perhaps more
importantly, increasingly progressive views on the ability of individuals to
decide for themselves what their sexual identities and experiences entail.286
Second, the Obergefell Court’s discussion of the connection between equal
protection and substantive due process may also be informative287 because
laws banning sex toys are likely to most negatively impact LGBTQIA+
couples,288 whom the Court has already protected under the animus
doctrine,289 and couples or individuals who are unable to engage in intimacy
without sexual devices.290
Thus, the next time the Court considers a state law that burdens private
decision-making, Reliable Consultants, Inc. would guide it toward rejecting
280. Id. at 217.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 746.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 745–46.
285. See supra Part I.D.
286. See Melissa Murray, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Complicated Legacy of
Obergefell v. Hodges, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1263, 1264 (2019).
287. See supra Part I.D.
288. See Katherine Schreiber, How Sex Toys Impact Relationships, PSYCH. TODAY (May
27, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-truth-about-exercise-addiction/
201705/how-sex-toys-impact-relationships [https://perma.cc/48PP-BUBY].
289. See supra notes 156–58 (discussing Romer and the animus doctrine).
290. See supra Part I.A.
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morality as a sufficient justification on its own and instead toward looking at
harm or coercion as a justifying principle. As for methodology, the Court
would place a higher premium on private decision-making and a smaller
premium on deference to state police powers and common-law prohibitions.
B. Ramifications of the Eleventh Circuit’s Methodology
The Eleventh Circuit’s substantive due process methodology is grounded
in the idea that the scope of substantive protections offered by the Fourteenth
Amendment is narrow and that judges should take the utmost care before
recognizing a new right.291 This formulation values principles of federalism
and relies on the democratic process to root out laws that no longer represent
the moral judgments of a state, carried out by the state’s electoral
decisions.292 Additionally, by holding that a liberty interest can only be
recognized by a court if it is deeply rooted in American history and tradition,
it configures the Due Process Clause to preserve certain common-law rights,
as opposed to rooting out new forms of discrimination or overreach that no
longer fit comfortably in the nation’s body politic.293
Just as Reliable Consultants, Inc. is the progeny of Lawrence and Justice
Stevens’s dissent in Bowers, Williams finds its roots in Glucksberg.294 For
both Glucksberg and Williams, the historical analysis is extensive and looks
to origins in U.S. law as well as the broader common-law tradition.295 The
real work of the Glucksberg methodology is done in framing the interest,
because that sets the groundwork for testing the right against history.296
However, while the Glucksberg Court framed the interest as the “right to
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so,”297 the
Williams court framed the interest more narrowly as the right to use devices
to stimulate one’s genital organs.298 The framing of the right is so significant
because the broader the asserted right, the easier it is to connect it with other
accepted liberty interests and vindicate a claim.299 However, the Williams
methodology would likely lead to a narrower substantive due process
methodology because, unlike Glucksberg, Williams narrowed the right down
to the specific means of the activity, rather than the activity itself.300
An adoption of the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisprudential approach would also
emphasize the democratic process and public debate over the Court’s
reasoned judgment. Specifically, the Court would be less likely to take an
asserted liberty interest and remove it from the states’ police powers if there
were active legislation on the topic and a robust public debate underway. In
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1235–36 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1239 (going through the Glucksberg analysis).
Id. at 1240.
See Hawley, supra note 79, at 339–40.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997).
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1246 (discussing the framing of the issue).
See Hassell, supra note 151, at 1004–05.
See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1249.
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adopting this approach, the Court would be recognizing prudential concerns,
democratic legitimacy, and principles of federalism.
IV. RESOLUTION
This Note argues that in substantive due process cases where the asserted
liberty interest is intimacy or sexual autonomy, Lawrence and Obergefell
instruct a broader test, such as the one applied in Reliable Consultants, Inc.,
and that the narrower test used in Williams is inappropriate. The complicated
and controversial history of substantive due process, from the Lochner era to
today, demonstrates that there are two tests for substantive due process
claims. On the one hand, when the liberty interest is intimacy and selfdefinition, the Court focuses on a broader conception of liberty and the
implications a violation has on all aspects of personal rights. The Court does
not sustain bare morals as a justification for the invasion. Further, in these
cases, the Court does not need to determine whether the specific liberty
interest is one that is deeply rooted and narrowly tailored in our nation’s
history and tradition. Rather it may decide whether the government’s
intrusion offends an aspect of liberty—here, privacy and sexual autonomy
vis-à-vis the use, possession, or sale of sex toys—that the Due Process Clause
has traditionally protected in its substantive form and that the government
cannot trample on, regardless of the process. On the other hand, when a claim
is detached from sexual liberty and intimacy, such as the right to die,301 and
the government regulation is closer to traditional conceptions of the states’
police powers, the Court adopts a stricter test that frames the right narrowly
and only finds a right fundamental if it is supported by history and tradition.
The Court should clarify its substantive due process jurisprudence by
formally recognizing a liberty interest in sexual privacy and autonomy. Only
by openly and honestly recognizing this right can Lawrence and Obergefell
be honestly interpreted and given their full effect by lower courts. Reliable
Consultants, Inc. does that by recognizing that the Supreme Court established
an expanded scope of liberty that the state cannot invade without a
compelling interest in cases of sexual privacy.
CONCLUSION
The liberty interest of sex toy users and vendors deserves to be recognized
and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has struggled to
articulate a consistent methodology for assessing sexual liberty claims, but
as long as Romer, Lawrence, and Obergefell are good law, it is clear that
courts must take an expansive view of sexual liberty. These cases instruct
courts to examine history (but not be controlled by it), consider the liberty
interest in light of the status of those affected, review and evaluate evolving
social standards and views, and understand that laws burdening private,
sexual decision-making are inherently suspect. Taken together, the liberty

301. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 530.
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interest implicated by sex toy use—private, intimate decision-making—is a
liberty interest that the Fourteenth Amendment protects.

